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Abstract
This article examines the impacts of two interconnected but distinct
regimes of  neoliberalism on global  health.  The first  is  the ‘rollback’
regime associated most commonly with the 1980’s and 1990’s when
efforts to build universal primary health care systems around the world
were  undermined  by  Structural  Adjustment  Programs  (SAPs)  and
associated forms of austerity and market rule. This rollback regime of
neoliberal conditionalization led to widespread health service cutbacks,
user fees, and other market-driven reforms that effectively replaced
plans  for  ‘health  for  all’  with  more  selective  and  exclusionary
approaches. The second neoliberal regime has been rolled-out in part
as a response to the resulting gaps in care and associated forms of
suffering  and  ill-health.  Where  the  rollback  regime  enforced
disinvestment,  the  ‘rollout’  regime  insists  instead  on  prioritizing
investment.    But  even  as  it  thereby  addresses  the  health  risks
produced by financialized neoliberal  conditionalization,  this reformed
rollout  regime  has  doubled-down  on  selectivity  by  adapting
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calculations from global finance to manage global health interventions.
This  emphasis  on  rationed  and  targeted  life-saving  investment  is
theorized here as illustrating a shift from the rollback regime’s laissez-
faire ‘macro market fundamentalism’ to an aidez-faire rollout of ‘micro
market foster-care’.
2
 “Countries will not be able to compete in tomorrow’s economy 
unless they invest much more, and more effectively, in their 
people – especially in health and education, which build human 
capital” (Kim, 2018a). 
In  January  2018,  in  a  report  from  Davos  entitled  ‘What  keeps  the
President  of  the World  Bank up at  night?’  Jim Yong Kim addressed
globalization and associated aspirations and frustrations before ending
with a telling translation of his longstanding global health concerns into
an argument about investment in human capital. He complained that:
“Too many heads of state and finance ministers tell us, ‘First we’ll grow
our  economies,  then we’ll  invest  in  our people’.”   In  response, Kim
explained that the World Bank was seeking to reverse these priorities
by  incentivizing  investment  in  people  with  a  new  Human  Capital
Project. He further highlighted how the project would feature a ranking
“which we hope will create much more demand for countries to invest
in  health  and  education.”  And,  underlining  the  Bank’s  interest  in
ensuring maximal returns on such investments, Kim claimed that the
project’s  data and analysis would also “help us advise countries on
where  to  invest  resources  for  the  biggest  impact  in  improving
outcomes in health and education” (Kim, 2018a).
As another competitive ranking regime designed to incentivize ‘best
buy’ investments and to maximize returns, the Human Capital Project
exemplifies a much wider economistic use of rankings and metrics in
contemporary governance (Darian-Smith, 2016).  But more than this, it
also  illustrates  a  systemic  shift  in  development  thinking  towards
targeted cost-effective social investment (Jenson, 2010). This is a shift
that  has  profoundly  reshaped  the  ways  in  which  interventions  in
development are imagined and implemented in the new millennium
(Berndt and Wirth, 2018; Mawdsley, 2018; Mitchell, 2017). Focusing on
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this  regime  change  and  its  impacts  on  global  health  policies  and
practices in particular, this article argues that the shift has led from the
destructive  disinvestment  dictates  of  traditional  neoliberal  austerity
towards  programs  of  reinvestment  in  health  that  are  much  more
constructive but which are also constrained and contorted by enduring
neoliberal concerns with economic returns on investment. To trace the
contours of these limitations, the article highlights how the shift from
the  rollbacks  of  disinvestment  to  the  rollout  of  new  reinvestment
rubrics also enacts significant reterritorializations of global health as an
assemblage  of  globalizing  but  simultaneously  localizing  ideas  and
interventions.   Historians  of  global  health  such  as  Randall  Packard
remind  us  that  the  resulting  pattern  of  top-down,  disease-specific
interventions  that  are imagined and implemented from afar  can be
traced right back to colonial medicine (Packard, 2016). But as enduring
and injurious  as  these historical  continuities  are,  this  article  argues
that neoliberal regime change – or, more precisely, a tendential and
dialectical  shift  in  emphasis  towards  neoliberal  crisis-management
amidst still ongoing forms of neoliberal crisis-creation – has played a
significant  role  in  reproducing  such  global  health  reterritorialization
today.
Kim’s rollout  of  the World Bank’s  Human Capital  Project is  a telling
example of neoliberal reinvestment with which to begin, particularly in
light of his subsequent January 2019 resignation from the Bank which
he explained in  terms of  taking-up an unexpected opportunity  at  a
private investment fund (compare Kim, 2018b and Bond, 2019).   This
is not where the arc of neoliberalism began at the Bank, and still less is
it the end point that Kim is depicted as pursuing in Bending the Arc, a
movie  about  the struggle  for  global  health by the NGO  Partners  in
Health (Davidson, 2017).   Instead, the Bank was central to the global
expansion and enforcement of rollback neoliberalism in the 1980’s and
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1990’s, and it was against the associated structural violence, suffering
and  dispossession  that  Kim’s  collaborations  in  global  health  were
originally organized as oppositional alternatives (Rice, 2016).  Indeed,
after his nomination by President Obama, his suitability for serving as
World  Bank  President  was  questioned  by  economic  elites  precisely
because of his co-editorship of one of the most comprehensive early
indictments  of  traditional  market  fundamentalist  neoliberalism
(Harding, 2012).  Entitled  Dying for Growth, the book began with an
introduction co-authored by Kim that named neoliberalism explicitly as
the  problem,  and  which  also  thereby  highlighted  how  associated
market fundamentalist assumptions led to failing policies for the poor:
“The idea that robust economic growth will automatically lead to
a better life for everybody is comforting.  Unfortunately, it is also
wrong...  The  proponents  of  neoliberal  principles  argue  that
economic  growth  promoted  in  this  way will  eventually  ‘trickle
down’ to improve the lives of the poor.  Increasingly, however,
such predictions have proved hollow” (Kim et al, 2000: 7).
Having thereby introduced  Dying for  Growth by critiquing neoliberal
‘trickle down’ visions about good growth leading to good health, Kim
and his colleagues went on in the book’s conclusion to venture a vision
that perceptively anticipated how market-rule might morph rather than
decline in the new millennium:
“History  repeats  itself.  While  the  names  may  change,  the
fundamental relations between rich and poor remain the same.
Yesteryear’s  colonialism  laid  the  foundation  of  today’s
neoliberalism, doubtless soon to be replaced with a new “ism”
for  the  new  millennium…  Unless  the  fundamental  relations
change,  however,  the  poor  will  probably  continue  to  suffer  a
disproportionate  amount  of  violence  and  disease”  (Kim  et  al,
2000: 384).
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This  article  does not  propose to critique a new ‘ism’,  but  the main
argument  of  the  pages  that  follow  is  that  global  health  has  been
remade through a form of regime change in neoliberal norms that has
unfortunately preserved all too many of the inequalities between rich
and poor that were critiqued by Kim and his colleagues back in 2000.
It is a regime change that is theorized here in terms of the shift from
the  market fundamentalist ‘rollback’ emphasis on disinvestment and
deterritorialization in the 1980’s and 1990’s, to a ‘rollout’ emphasis on
market  foster-care reinvestment  and  reterritorialization  in  the  new
millennium.  This is not to suggest that austerity and socio-economic
abandonment  have  been  overcome  as  major  threats  to  health.
Disinvestment  in  health,  and  in  health  services  for  poor  people  in
particular,  continues to damage health  outcomes around the world,
including in highly unequal rich countries such as the US and UK where
associated neoliberal norms of self-blame are increasingly embodied in
self-harm  such  as  suicides  and  drug  overdoses  (Case  and  Deaton,
2017; Hiam et al, 2018; Sparke, 2017; Stuckler and Basu, 2013).  Nor is
the  point  here  to  imply  that  neoliberal  arguments  for  investing  in
health  as  a  form of  human capital  are  new.  Indeed,  the  neoliberal
framing of health spending as a form human capital investment can be
traced back to Chicago School arguments from the 1960’s that Gary
Becker and others have continued to develop ever since (e.g. Mushkin,
1962;  and,  Becker,  2007).   For  these  reasons,  this  article  is  not
postulating some simple historical break between completely distinct
neoliberal periods.  Instead, the two tendencies towards disinvestment
and  reinvestment  respectively  are  better  seen  as  counter-balanced
and contradictory neoliberal imperatives tied to shifting policy-making
emphases. The rollout of reinvestment policy-making is theorized thus
as being more actively promoted today as a response to disinvestment
dynamics that nevertheless remain active. 
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The  distinction  between  ‘rollback  neoliberalism’  and  ‘rollout
neoliberalism’ is itself adapted here from an influential theorization of
neoliberal  regime  change  by  geographers  who  also  explored  the
spatial implications of the shifting emphases (Peck and Tickell, 2002).
Following this line of analysis into global health, the shift from the roll-
back to roll-out emphases can also be analyzed in terms of a double
movement  from  deterritorializing  disinvestment  to  reterritorializing
reinvestment.  This  double  movement  of  deterritorialization  and
reterritorialization  serves  thus  as  geographical  short-hand  for
describing  how  the  undermining  of  nationally-organized  ‘horizontal’
health systems, protections  and plans by rollback neoliberalism has
actually prepared the ground for their uneven and patchy replacement
in the new millennium by the rollout of globally-organized yet often
sub-national and ‘vertical’ disease-specific interventions. 
Political theorists will note that the terminology of ‘deterritorialization’
and  ‘reterritorialization’  has  roots  in  post-structuralist  arguments
aimed  at  deconstructing  bounded  concepts  of  ‘desire’  and  the
‘unconscious’  in  psychoanalysis  (Deleuze and Guattari,  1983).   This
intellectual inheritance raises questions about the unconscious and no
less bounded cultural politics of ‘reinvestment’ to which we will return
here only in conclusion.  For the rest of the article, by contrast, it is the
more material political-economic geographies of global health policy-
making that are the main concern.  Peck and Tickell’s own attention to
the spatial upheavals of rollback and rollout neoliberalism provide a
useful initial orientation in this regard. Back in 2002, they suggested
three  main  ways  of  theorizing  neoliberalization’s  geographical
implications:  namely,  i)  its  forcing  of  local  governments  into  global
competition  and  regulatory  reform;  ii)  its  spatial  contingency  and
resulting variegation across different geographies; and iii) its virus-like
global mutation as it spreads across space.  In what follows, the first of
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these developments is addressed in relation to the deterritorialization
effects  of  rollback  neoliberalism,  whereas  the  topic  of  spatial
contingency is taken up in relation to the reterritorialization effects of
rollout neoliberalism. But attuned to the multiple ‘vectors’ of ‘structural
pathogenesis’  highlighted  by  Sell  and  Williams  (2018)  in  their
introduction to this special issue, the two sections together argue that
the virus-like global mutation of neoliberalism can be traced across the
whole double movement from deterritorialization to reterritorialization,
remaking the policy space of global health in pathogenic ways that are
ultimately embodied in uneven experiences of life and death.
The  reference  to  ‘policy  space’  in  debates  over  neoliberalism  and
development policy is usually applied to the diverse political-economic
contexts constraining the ability of governments to develop programs
free from the rules of neoliberal conditionality set by the IMF and World
Bank (Kentikelensis  et al, 2016).  This is also the starting point here.
But, framed in terms of deterritorialization and reterritorialization, two
consequential  concerns  with  how  neoliberalism  reworks  territorial
sovereignty and governmentality are brought into focus too.  First, at
the  macro  level  of  neoliberal  governance  globally,  the  territorial
transformations of  policy space mean that we must also study how
national  regulations  are  overruled  and undermined  by transnational
processes  of  global  uneven  development,  processes  that  have  also
often  led  to  the  reterritorialization  of  international  relations  at  the
same time (Harvey, 2005; Tuathail and Luke, 1994).  Second, at the
micro  level  of  subject  formation  and  biopolitics  under  neoliberal
governmentality, the territorial transformations of policy space are also
intimately tied to how national citizenship has itself been recodified by
market-mediated  tendencies  towards  individualization,
responsibilization  and  self-investment  (Brown,  2015;  Dean,  2010).
Connecting  these  macro  and  micro  scales  of  analysis,  and  thereby
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hybridizing  their  diverse  Marxian,  Foucauldian  and  feminist
inspirations,  a  growing  heterodox  literature  on  neoliberalization
suggests  that  the  resulting  reterritorializations  enlist  some  sub-
populations  into  ‘graduated  sovereignty’,  ‘denationalization’  and
‘therapeutic  citizenship’,  while  exposing  others  to  pathological
experiences of ‘exclusion’,  ‘expulsion’ and ‘biological sub-citizenship’
(Brown, 2010; Ngyuen, 2010; Ong, 2006; Sassen, 2014; Sparke, 2017).
Put  simply,  such  work  suggests  that  neoliberal  attempts  at  global
integration  and inclusion often bring new enclosures and exclusions
too.  It is precisely such concerns with enclosure and exclusion that
animate this article’s exploration of the limits of investments in global
health that  are imagined and implemented in  terms of  investing in
human capital.
Guided by the theories  and questions  outlined  above,  the  following
pages offer a two-part analysis of the concatenation of rollback and
rollout  neoliberalism  in  the  evolution  of  global  health’s  territorial
imagination  and  organization.   Section  1  describes  the  interlinked
patterns of disinvestment and deterritorialization, drawing on the large
and  interdisciplinary  literature  that  now  exists  on  the  pathogenic
impacts of market fundamentalist neoliberalism and connecting them
to  the  deterritorialization  of  the  policy  space  of  national  state
regulation, management and protection.  Section 2 proceeds in turn to
examine the rollout of reinvestment and reterritorialization,  focusing
on the ways in which the associated targeting of populations for health
assistance has been organized by the new concern with fostering the
human capital needed to survive in an ever more competitive global
market economy.  
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1)  Rollback  neoliberalism  and  the  deterritorialization  of
national health 
Rollback neoliberalism is a useful summary term for all the policies and
programs  promoting  privatization,  market  liberalization,  business
deregulation  and  the  rolling  back  of  state  protections  and  public
services. An early example was the violent overthrow of democratic
socialism in Chile in 1973, involving a radical free-market make-over of
the country based on the advice of economists trained in neoliberal
principles  at  the  University  of  Chicago  (Klein,  2007).   This  initial
neoliberal  coup  noted,  rollback  neoliberalism  is  more  commonly
associated with the broader ‘structural adjustments’ that were made a
decade later in the 1980’s and 1990’s.  This was a period when the
political and economic instabilities bequeathed by the ‘stagflationary’
1970’s  enabled  Ronald  Reagan  and  Margaret  Thatcher  to  advance
radical pro-market reforms in the US and UK, including the roll-back of
diverse welfare-state and worker protections.  Conquering stagflation
in the US through the imposition of high interest rates by the Federal
Reserve (itself  a neoliberal  rollback of  Keynesian principles),  in turn
precipitated  global  debt  crises  that  led  to  the  IMF and World  Bank
imposing  systemic  neoliberal  rollback  in  the  world’s  most  debt-
vulnerable countries in the form of conditionality codified in Structural
Adjustment Programs (SAPs).  
Even though the primary goal of conditionality and the SAPs was to
stabilize  the  global  financial  system,  they  nevertheless  were  very
effective in enforcing rollback neoliberalism across the Global  South
(Packard, 2016).  They thereby also came to exemplify how rollback
neoliberalism worked more generally to undermine health and health
systems.  Tracing these damaging impacts –  including the rolling back
of plans for ‘Health for All’ that had famously been declared just a few
years previously at the WHO meeting in Alma Ata in 1978 –  provides a
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starting point here for conceptualizing some of the wider ways in which
rollback neoliberalism functioned globally to deterritorialize the policy
space in which governments could have developed health systems and
secured health citizenship rights for their people. 
Following the unofficial rulebook of the ‘Washington Consensus’ about
the  need  to  ‘Stabilize,  Liberalize  and  Privatize’  debt  encumbered
economies,  SAPs  obliged  affected  countries  to  reduce  government
deficits, cut public spending, liberalize trade and capital markets, and
privatize public services in areas such as health and education.  These
neoliberal rollbacks constituted the core conditionalities on which loan
rescheduling  was  conditioned  by  the  IMF  and  World  Bank.   The
resulting cutbacks thereby also came to conditionalize health, directly
cutting  funding  for  health  systems  and  health  workers,  and  more
generally  undermining the plans that  many post-colonial  states had
been developing  in  the  1970’s  to  provide  universal  primary  health.
Health  outcomes  were  further  conditionalized  by  neoliberal  shock
therapy in areas of governance beyond health itself. As was critiqued
by Kim and his colleagues in Dying for Growth (Kim et al, 2000), these
rollback reforms created inequalities and insecurities in the pursuit of
market-led  growth  that  also  thereby  functioned  frequently,  albeit
indirectly,  as  deadly  social  determinants  of  ill-health.   Thus,  as
Alexander  Kentikelenis  (2017)  has  made  clear  in  a  comprehensive
review of the research that has continued to follow these intersecting
lines of critique, the causal connections between structural adjustment
and  ill-health  travelled  along  at  least  three  distinguishable  policy
pathways:  i)  policies  directly  targeting  health  systems;  ii)  policies
indirectly  impacting  health  systems;  and iii)  policies  affecting wider
social determinants of health. Following Kentikelenis, we can use this
same threefold distinction here to review the many research articles
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and books that have documented evidence of the particular pathways
involved as well as charting their continuation into the present.
i)  Studies  documenting  the  direct  damage done  by  SAPs  to  health
investments  by  governments  are  now  numerous  (Gloyd,  2004;
Rowden,  2009;  Pfeiffer &Chapman,  2010;  Stuckler  and Basu, 2009).
Moreover, since the early experience with SAPs, health sector spending
has gone on being constrained by evolving forms of conditionality that
have  been  found  to  have  damaging  consequences  (CGD,  2007;
Kentikelenis et al, 2015). Cuts to health spending are thus the first and
most obvious direct pathway linking neoliberal rollbacks to weakened
health systems and poor health outcomes. A second direct pathway
relates to  limits  placed on health worker recruitment and retention.
Wage  bill  ceilings  imposed  on  public  sector  systems  through
conditionality  have  limited  the  ability  of  governments  to  train  and
retain the right mix of health workers (Marphatia, 2009;  McCoy et al,
2008). As a result,  country led efforts to fight infectious disease and
child  and maternal mortality have also been impeded (Stuckler  and
Basu, 2009).  A third direct pathway has involved reductions in health
coverage,  most  frequently  shifting  costs  to  individuals  through  the
imposition of user fees and co-payments for medicines (Farmer, 2015;
Sen and Koivusalu, 1998).  And a related fourth direct pathway that
has often led to the roll back of health services for the poor has been
health sector privatization,  either through the opening of healthcare
markets to private providers (Homedes and Ugalde, 2005), or through
the NGO-ization of health service provision (a development tied to the
neoliberal  rollouts we turn to in the next main section).   All  four of
these pathways consist of context contingent causal connections, and
it  is  important  to  note  in  this  regard  that  in  some  contexts
conditionality has actually led to increases in health spending at the
same as causing cuts in public spending on social policy and welfare
12
(Noy, 2011).  For the same reason, though, it is equally important to
highlight two sets of indirect causal connections relating to these wider
influences on heath outcomes. 
ii)  As  Kentikelenis  makes  clear,  there  are  at  least  four  additional
pathways  through  which  structural  adjustment  and  neoliberal
conditionality  have indirectly  impacted health  systems.   The first  is
privatization,  which has often led to former public sector employees
losing  health  benefits  (Stuckler  and  Basu,  2013)  as  well  as  to  the
fragmentation of health systems (Owoh, 1996). The second is currency
devaluation,  which  has  led  to  spiraling  forms  of  inflation,  social
insecurity and rapid rises in the costs of imported medicine.  The third
is  conditionality  enforced  trade  liberalization,  which  has  often  been
implemented  through  trade  agreements  that  make  it  harder  for
countries to manufacture or import generic drugs (Correa, 2006).  And
the fourth is comprised of a series of uneven impacts on aid flows,
which  have  been  mixed  and  by  no  means  always  catalytic  of  aid
(Stubbs,  Kentikelenis,  &  King,  2016).   All  of  these  dynamics  have
continued to conditionalize health long after the SAPs of the 1980’s
and 1990’s, and, for the same reason, they are discussed in greater
detail below.
iii) The other main set of indirect causal connections involve pathways
through the social determinants of health.  These are ties that have
been documented exhaustively in the WHO’s Commission on the Social
Determinants of Health (WHO, 2008), as well as separately by scholars
involved as contributors to the Commission (e.g. Labonté, & Schrecker,
2007;  Labonté,  et al  2009).   A key conclusion of  this  body of  work
concerns the ways in which the roll-back neoliberal reforms associated
initially with SAPs and conditionality have been globally expanded and
entrenched  in  ways  that  have  straitjacketed  governments,
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systematically blocking them from the sorts of spending on education,
welfare, and housing that can protect populations from health threats,
while  also  limiting  their  ability  to  pass  and  enforce  laws  affecting
health  and  safety  at  work,  and  exposure  to  diverse  toxins  and
environmental hazards.  This removal of room for policy maneuver in
has  been  described  variously  as  the  curtailment  or  shrinkage  or
conditionalization of the policy space in which governments can act on
the social determinants of health (Labonté, et al 2009; Sparke, 2017).
And this kind of conditionalization has continued to condition policy-
making into the present, even amidst renouncements of conditionality
by IMF leaders and others that set the conditionalization in motion in
the first place (Kentikelenis et al, 2016).  Beyond policy-making space,
the wider  ecological  spaces conditioning health  have also been the
focus  of  research  exploring  indirect  pathways  between  rollback
neoliberalism  and  ill-health.  Most  notable  in  this  regard  are  the
disease  emergence  analyses  showing  how  conditionality-induced
cutbacks in health services have combined with other neoliberal forces
ranging from the impacts of export-led agri-business on forest systems
to  the  imposition  of  cost-effectiveness  constraints  on  the
administration  of  anti-biotics  to  co-create  the  conditions  for  public
health disasters such as the Ebola outbreak in west Africa (Kentikelenis
et al, 2014; Wallace et al, 2016) and the development of drug resistant
TB Latin America (Kim et al 2005).
An  important  conclusion  of  all  these  studies  of  the  connections
between rollback neoliberalism and challenges for health is that all of
the  pathways  have  led  away  from  the  vision  of  Health  for  All
articulated in 1978 at the WHO conference in Alma Ata.   This certainly
does not mean that the WHO has itself been entirely refashioned along
neoliberal lines.  A neoliberal recoding of world health as a necessary
step toward world wealth has happened alongside all sorts of enduring
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commitments  at  the  WHO to  universalistic  programs such as  those
focused on essential medicines (compare Chorev, 2013, and Greene,
2011).   Nevertheless,  in  the  world  beyond the  WHO the  neoliberal
eclipse of the principles of Alma Ata has proceeded apace. This is an
enduring argument of Kim’s colleague Paul Farmer in his critical writing
on the structural violence ensuing from structural adjustment (Farmer,
2004; Farmer et al, 2006).  Along with Kim and the other coauthors of
the  global  health  textbook,  Reimagining  Global  Health,  it  is  also  a
critique that they together turn into a form of inaugural turning point in
their  account  of  the  subsequent  rise of  contemporary  global  health
(Farmer et al, 2013).  Alma Ata in this narrative emerges as a zenith of
global  health  idealism  and  inclusivity  that  Washington  Consensus
neoliberalism  subsequently  eclipsed.  Building  on  the  arguments  of
Dying for Growth, they argue thus that conditionality and SAPs in the
1980’s effectively rolled back the plans made at Alma Ata for universal
primary  health  care.   They  explain  that  other  technical  and
professional  influences  tied  to  the  intellectual  advancement  of
selective primary health were involved too, and we will  turn back to
these  here  in  relation  to  the  counter  movements  towards
reterritorialization examined in  section 2.  But  first,  following Farmer
and colleagues, it remains critical to consider how the eclipse of Alma
Ata  set  the  pattern  for  how rollback  neoliberalism  would  go  on  to
deterritorialize national health governance and health citizenship more
generally.
The WHO conference in Alma Ata in 1978 had brought together three
thousand delegates  from 134 nation-states.  The consensus  reached
after their seven days of deliberation reaffirmed the WHO’s own post-
war founding definition of health and health rights, insisting explicitly
on  associated  national  government  health  responsibilities  for
developing universal primary health care (Cueto, 2004). The ten points
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of the resulting declaration reflected numerous intersecting influences,
including a shared vision that health “as a state of complete physical,
mental and social wellbeing… is a fundamental human right” (Framer
et al, 2013,  355;  and Packard,  2016).  Arguments from post-colonial
nation-states  tied  to  the  Non-Aligned  Movement  and  the  G77  were
critical in advocating this shared vision, including their allied critiques
of the failings of traditional Western-dominated development (Thomas
and  Weber,  2004).  Instead  of  the  disease-specific  biomedical
campaigns  associated  with  such  development,  and  following
arguments advanced by WHO director Halfdan Mahler, there was great
emphasis  on  the  new  model  of  primary  health  care  already  being
planned in countries such as Costa Rica, Mozambique, Tanzania, China
and Cuba. For the same reasons, the delegates and declaration both
underscored  the  wider  need  for  improvements  in  the  social  and
economic  sectors  impacting  health  as  well.   But  ironically  and
tragically,  it  was precisely through these same social  and economic
sectors  –  operating  as  vectors  for  a  mutating  neoliberalism  –  that
conditionality  and  SAPs  subsequently  came  to  have  their  rollback
effects in reversing the legacy of Alma Ata in the 1980’s.
To be sure, the conference concluded without generating any detailed
guidelines about implementation, and also without securing any global
funding.  These drawbacks certainly help explain why countries were
ill-prepared in the 1980’s to follow the recommendations for expanding
national  health  systems  and  honoring  the  principles  of  inclusive
national  health  citizenship  with  universal  access  to  primary  health
care.   Packard  argues  that  the  health  policy-making  lessons  drawn
from the success of smallpox eradication (and the failure of the WHO’s
malaria eradication efforts) also played an additional role in the return
to  vertical,  disease-specific  approaches  in  international  health
(Packard, 2016).   But he, along with the authors of Reimagining Global
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Health, and so many other critical accounts of rollback neoliberalism,
all agree that it was conditionality and SAPs that most actively rolled
back  the  plans  made  at  Alma  Ata,  making  their  funding  and
implementation impossible.  Both the visions  of  national  government
responsibility and of primary health universality that had been laid out
in  1978 were  thereby undermined,  clearing the policy  space for  its
subsequent recolonization by global projects emphasizing selectivity in
the years that followed.  
Before we turn in Section 2 to the reterritorializing effects of selective
reinvestment,  it  is  critical  here  to  highlight  first  how  the
deterritorializing effects of rollback neoliberalism have not disappeared
in the present.  Instead, from the first waves of pro-business reform
and structural adjustment in the 1980’s and 1990’s on into the new
millennium, the mutating virus of market-led transformation has gone
global, making the discourse of globalization itself do double duty as a
synonym  for  neoliberalization,  and  expanding  market  rule  across
countries  that  never  knew  classical  liberalism  and  welfare  state
liberalism in  the  first  place  (Sparke,  2013;  Zhang and Peck,  2014).
With this  global  expansion and entrenchment of  neoliberalism have
come at least three distinct kinds of deterritorialization, and with each
we need to  trace  how disinvestment  and  regulatory  rollbacks  have
undermined possibilities for national health governance and national
health citizenship just as SAPs undermined the plans made at Alma
Ata.
First  there  is  the  evolving  impact  of  ongoing  austerity  and
conditionality.   Compounding  all  the  disinvestment  dynamics
generated by SAPs in  the 1980’s  and 1990’s,  structural  adjustment
was reworked going into the new millennium through the IFI’s ‘Heavily
Indebted  Poor  Country’  (HIPC)  programming and repackaged in  the
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form of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs).   The argument
from the World Bank and IMF themselves was that these new country-
specific rulebooks  for  rollback  neoliberalism would  be authored and
therefore  ‘owned’  by  the  countries  subject  to  their  rules  (World
Bank/IMF 2002).  In this way, PRSPs were meant to be comprehensively
country-driven,  results-oriented,  and  partnership-oriented  (Klugman,
2002).   With  their  declared  focus  on  assisting  countries  in  poverty
reduction,  they  were  also  supposed  to  look  less  like  a  neocolonial
imposition  of  programs  predicated  on  the  financial  stabilization
interests of the first world (Craig and Porter, 2003).   But even as they
were  announced  as  a  less  draconian  form  of  neoliberal  nudging
towards poverty reduction guided by public participation, PRSPs have
continued  to  enforce  market  discipline  and  associated  budgetary
austerity  by  making  business  friendly  policy-making  an  enduring
condition  for  debt  management  and debt  relief  in  heavily  indebted
countries (Gould, 2005; Wamala et al, 2007).  Moreover, whereas this
market-compliant  conditioning  of  policy  space  by  PRSPs  remains
binding,  IMF-approved  poverty  reduction  proposals  for  innovations
such as social expenditure floors have almost always been left as ‘non-
binding’ (Kentikelenis et al, 2016: 21).
SAPs may no longer be the preferred term of the IFIs, but the sapping
of  health  system  capacity  and  health  worker  morale  continues
nonetheless  (compare  Gloyd,  2004,  and  Strong,  2017).  Meanwhile,
efforts to develop sector-wide approaches or ‘SWAps’ to address such
problems  with  globally  sourced  development  assistance  have  also
been  frustrated  by  the  ways  in  which  the  ongoing  austerity  has
constrained  how  much  aid  can  be  placed  ‘on  budget’  in  national
accounts  (Pfeiffer  et  al 2017).   Indeed,  these constraints  have now
combined  with  the  selective  disease-targeting  tendencies  we  will
explore in section 2 to lead to disinvestment in SWAps since 2010. In
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the  period  from  2010  to  2016  the  percentage  allocation  of
development assistance for health to SWAps has thereby declined by
13%, for an absolute disinvestment total of $540 million (see Figure 1
below).
Figure 1: Graph showing % change in DAH focus areas from 2010-16
(IHME, 2018)
Second,  often  enforced  in  poor  countries  by  SAPs,  but  impacting
middle income and wealthy countries too, another form of neoliberal
rollback driving the deterritorialization of national health systems and
health  citizenship  has  been  trade  and  financial  liberalization.
Globalized in the name of liberalizing trade and rolling-back national
regulations that inhibit global competition, trade rules have expanded
and  enforced  new  market-based  regulations  and  mechanisms  that
powerfully  circumscribe  the  policy  space  of  national  governments.
Both  the  monopoly-creating  expansion  of  intellectual  property
protections and the competition-creating effects of trade liberalization
must  be  considered  in  this  way  in  terms  of  their  deterritorializing
impacts on national health governance and citizenship. In addition, the
autonomy  of  national  governments  worldwide  has  been  further
undermined  by deregulated capital  markets,  financial  volatility,  and
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the ability of powerful investors to discipline non-compliant countries
with downgraded ratings and disinvestment.  Scholars of global health
have highlighted the pathogenic impacts of all three of these vectors,
both as they intersect and as they operate autonomously.  
Through international  agreements such as the WTO's Trade Related
Intellectual  Property  protections  (TRIPs),  IP  patent extensions across
both  time  and  space  have  created  monopolies  that  systematically
increase drug prices, making essential medicines too costly even for
some of the world’s  wealthiest countries and rolling back treatment
access  for  millions  (Craddock,  2007;  t’Hoen,  2009).  Pharmaceutical
companies and their representatives argue that the monopoly prices
that  are  secured  by  global  patenting  are  what  provide  the  profits
needed to incentivize investment in  research and development  into
new  breakthrough  medicines.  But  even  a  recent  UNDP  panel  that
included  corporate  representatives  concluded  that  the  system  was
broken,  effectively  incentivizing  disinvestment  in  innovations  that
might  respond  to  urgent  global  challenges  such  as  drug  resistant
disease (UNDP, 2016).  Other critics further highlight the ways in which
the globalization of IP protections has also been rolling back some of
the few national patent regimes – such as India’s – that have allowed
for  the development  of  cheaper generic  versions of  essential  drugs
(Kapczynski, 2009). 
Despite some hard fought victories around access to ARVs in the fight
against AIDS (Heywood, 2002), efforts to respond to the more global
rollbacks in access continue to be rolled back themselves, including
through new ‘TRIPS-plus’ rules designed to forestall the development
of generics by patenting and thereby privatizing the scientific results of
drug trials;  a complex problem which also raises complex questions
about researching such preemption in practice  (Sell, 2007; Shadlen,
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this  issue).   Pharmaceutical  companies  may sometimes  concede  to
patent overrides in a specific case of a first line drug, only so as to
better position themselves for market monopolization with second line
drugs  later  (Biehl,  2007).   They  may  go  along  with  the  Doha
Declaration on the ability of governments to make exceptions in cases
of national emergency, all the while knowing that most countries lack
the  production  capacity  or  importation  options  that  make  such
exceptions  actionable  (t’Hoen,  2009).   And  they  are  increasingly
embracing accommodation with tiered pricing schemes, hoping that
this will forestall the wider use of compulsory licensing by governments
even  as  it  allows  for  new  forms  of  price-fixing  sanctioned  by  the
world’s leading global health agencies (Williams et al, 2015).
Trade-based rollback neoliberalism works in less complex, but in more
wide-ranging  ways  when  it  comes  to  the  competition  and
harmonization effects of trade liberalization.  Advocates of free trade
prefer to see the associated rollback of tariff and non-tariff barriers to
trade in terms of economic efficiencies, linking trade liberalization in
this way with greater consumer welfare. But by freeing companies to
move to low cost and low regulation locations, and by forcing states to
compete  to  keep employers  by  lowering  their  taxes and standards,
these same competitive economic processes lead to diminished health
citizenship  rights  as  they  undermine  health  and  safety  at  work
protections, overrule environmental and public health protections, and
reduce the tax receipts that can pay for public health services (Labonte
and Schrecker, 2007; Labonte et al., 2009; Peckham et al, 2017).  The
removal or harmonization of non-tariff barriers to trade also make it
much harder for governments to restrict the flow of health hazardous
goods such as obesogenic foods (Snowdon and Thow, 2013). Combined
with  the  disciplinary  and  volatility  effects  of  deregulated  financial
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markets,  the  crises  created  by  these  global  market  forces  further
increase  the  challenges  for  governments  seeking  to  protect  public
health (Benatar  et al., 2011).   And, as Ted Schrecker argues in this
special  issue  and  elsewhere,  these  same dynamics  that  undermine
government  capacity  simultaneously  serve  to  exacerbate  the
vulnerability-inducing  machinery  of  deregulated  capitalism  itself
(Schrecker, 2016).  It is to these impacts of rollback neoliberalism on
the underlying social determinants of health that we turn next.
Third, the spread of rollback reforms through the social determinants
of  health  in  general  has  been  described  by  many  as  a  form  of
‘neoliberal epidemic’ (Farmer, 1999; 2003; Schrecker, 2016; Schrecker
and Bambra, 2015). This epidemiological metaphor is especially useful
when it comes to highlighting how the different vectors of vulnerability
generated by rollback neoliberalism come together to enable what Sell
and Williams in this volume call structural pathogenesis in the social
body  politic.  It  also  obviously  gives  an  additional  epidemiological
meaning  to  Peck  and  Tickell  account  of  neoliberalism’s  virus-like
mutations as a series of ideas and imperatives spreading across space
globally.   Critical explorations of these viral movements as they relate
to the movement of real viruses have shown in turn that whether the
mutations  work  through  political,  economic  or  ecological  pathways
they end up becoming embodied  in  unequal  experiences  of  illness,
infection and even sometimes, as Rob Wallace and colleagues have
shown, the evolution of lethal new viruses too (Wallace et al 2016).  In
other words, neoliberal epidemics are far more than just a metaphor.
Their illness inducing impacts lead through the social determinants of
health  to  real  restrictions  on  national  health  governance  and  real,
which is to say embodied, exclusions from health citizenship.   
In the actual epidemiological literature on the social determinants of
health it is normally metrics of socio-economic inequality – including its
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causes,  consequences  and  the  governmental  capacity  to  moderate
both – that serve as the main indicators of the neoliberal virus.  In their
2008 report on the Social Determinants of Health, for example, the key
conclusion  of  the  WHO  commissioners  was  that:  “Inequalities  are
killing people on a grand scale” (WHO 2008: 6). They did not use the
words  rollback  neoliberalism  or  deterritorialization  to  describe  the
causes  of  increased  inequality,  but  they  did  highlight  how  the
‘structural  drivers’  of  ‘bad  policies,  economics,  and  politics’  had
traversed  territory  and  gone  global  with  market-led  globalization.
“These ‘structural drivers’,” they concluded, “operate within countries
under the authority of governments, but also, increasingly over the last
century  and  a  half,  between  countries  under  the  effects  of
globalization. This toxic combination of bad policies, economics, and
politics is, in large measure, responsible for the fact that a majority of
people in the world do not enjoy the good health that is biologically
possible” (WHO, 2008: 26).  
Appearing in early 2008, the report arrived at the best and worst of
times. An epic crisis caused by financial deregulation rocked the world
just as it was being published. At once vindicating the Commissioners’
arguments about toxic economics and politics, but also replacing their
concern for all those left behind by global health improvements with a
new frenzy of global concern for the ‘too big to fail’ economic actors at
the center of the global meltdown.  Yet again an ideational legacy of
Alma Ata  –  in  this  case  the  WHO’s  2008  report’s  emphasis  on  the
problems  of  inequality  –  was  eclipsed  by  a  material  break-down in
markets liberalized by rollback neoliberalism. 
The following year, in an extraordinary speech before the World Health
Assembly in 2009, the WHO Director General Margaret Chan did her
best  to  bring  back  a  social-determinants  approach  to  the  multiple
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crises of market fundamentalist policy-making.  She also did not refer
to rollback neoliberalism explicitly,  but her epidemiological  overview
presented a compelling critique nonetheless.  As such it  is  a fitting
summary  with  which  to  close  this  review  of  the  damaging
deterritorialization  effects  on national  health governance and health
citizenship right around the world.
Last year, our imperfect world delivered, in short order, a fuel
crisis,  a  food  crisis,  and  a  financial  crisis.  It  also  delivered
compelling evidence that the impact of climate change has been
seriously underestimated. All of these events have global causes
and global  consequences,  with  serious  implications  for  health.
They are  not  random events.   Instead,  they are  the result  of
massive failures in the international systems that govern the way
nations  and  their  populations  interact.  In  short:  they  are  the
result of bad policies…. In far too many cases, economic growth
has  been  pursued,  with  single-minded purpose,  as  the  be-all,
end-all,  cure-for-all.  The  assumption  that  market  forces  could
solve most problems has not proved true. Too many models of
development  have  assumed  that  living  conditions  and  health
status  would  somehow  automatically  improve  as  countries
modernized,  liberalized  their  trade,  and  improved  their
economies.  This did not happen.” (Chan, 2009)
Rollout  neoliberalism  and  the  reterritorialization  of  global
health 
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis and of the subsequent
‘great  recession’  many  voices  previously  associated  with  market
fundamentalist policy-making started to declare that neoliberalism had
been oversold  (e.g. Ostry  et  al, 2016).   But  amidst  this  revisionist
clamor, it seems as if the end of neoliberalism has itself been oversold,
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and often, as with disingenuous disavowals of conditionality, in ways
that  obfuscate  ongoing  forms  of  market  rule  (Kentikelensis  et  al,
2016). Rather than being rejected altogether, it appears more accurate
to argue instead that neoliberalism is being remade.  This is the first of
two  reasons  for  emphasizing  the  regime  change  of  rollout
neoliberalism  here.   The  second  is  that  by  focusing  on  the  rollout
process  it  is  also  possible  to  trace  the  reterritorializing  impacts  on
global health governance and citizenship.  To do so we need to focus in
particular  on  the  machinery  of  calculation,  accounting  and  funding
through  which  today’s  discourses  demanding  more  investment  in
global health also turn global health population targets (such as those
included in  the UN’s  Sustainable Development  Goals)  into  territorial
targets for intervention. 
It  needs  noting  at  the  outset  that  when  Peck  and  Tickell  first
distinguished  rollout  neoliberalism  from  rollback  neoliberalism  their
main focus was on the disciplinary rollout in the UK and America of
interventionist innovations in social policy such as welfare-to-workfare
reforms and punitive inner-city policing.  They were interested in this
respect in how these neoliberal rollouts were designed deliberately to
remake  societies  in  ways  that  might  protect  rollback  reforms  from
unrest by those who had been excluded and dispossessed. “No longer
concerned narrowly with the mobilization and extension of markets,”
they argued, “[rollout] neoliberalism is increasingly associated with the
political  foregrounding  of  new  modes  of  ‘social’  and  penal  policy-
making,  concerned  specifically  with  the  aggressive  reregulation,
disciplining, and containment of those marginalized or dispossessed by
the  neoliberalization  of  the  1980s”  (Peck  and  Tickell,  2002:  389).
They suggested in turn that the resulting neoliberal policy repertoire
included:
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the  selective  appropriation  of  ‘community’  and  nonmarket
metrics,  the  establishment  of  social-capital  discourses  and
techniques,  the  incorporation  (and  underwriting)  of  local-
governance and partnership-based modes of policy development
and  program  delivery  …,  [and]  the  mobilization  of  the  ‘little
platoons’  in  the  shape  of  (local)  voluntary  and  faith-based
associations in the service of neoliberal goals” (Peck and Tickell,
2002: 390).
Both the contrasts and continuities with the rollout of global health as
an investment in human capital must be addressed carefully.  On the
one side the aggressive forms of ‘neopaternalism’ identified by Peck
and Tickell, along with their often racist and sexist assumptions about
undeserving  underclasses,  are  a  far  cry  from  the  life-saving  and
inclusionary  interventions  of  contemporary  global  health.   Indeed,
many of today’s calls for investing in global health are made explicitly
in the name of fighting racist exclusion and empowering women and
children.   Moreover,  it  needs  to  be  underlined  that  the  global  civil
society  activism that  has  driven  demands  to  make  global  health  a
reality (and not just a set of programs) is by no means reducible to
neoliberalism.   Indeed,  in  cases  such  as  South  Africa’s  Treatment
Action Coalition it has been explicitly anti-neoliberal (Heywood, 2002).
Nevertheless, this has not stopped neoliberal logics and practices from
coming to shape how global health programming is done.  In turn this
means  that  many  other  aspects  of  the  policy  repertoire  of  rollout
neoliberalism described by Peck and Tickell – partnerships, metrics of
non-market capital, and the mobilization of volunteers and NGOs in the
place of government services – have come to shape how global health
in the new millennium is practiced. And these influential practices raise
challenging questions about the limits of global health when imagined
and implemented as a compensatory kind of rollout neoliberalism.  
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Rather than judging these questions about limitations in an absolutist
or moralistic way, the approach here is to argue that the limits need to
be explored in  terms of  how certain neoliberal  logics  constrain and
contort  the  resulting  interventions.   Global  health  has  rarely  been
imagined  in  terms  of  containing  unrest,  although  some geopolitical
arguments were made in the US that investment in AIDS prevention
and treatment was needed to stop AIDS orphans becoming terrorists
(Ingram, 2009).  Still less does global health involve penal policing and
the  incarceration  of  the  dispossessed.   But  insofar  as  it  has  been
imagined  in  terms  of  reinvesting  in  those  who  have  suffered
disinvestment, and insofar as these logics and languages lead to the
subordination of universality to selectivity, they can be evaluated for
the ways in which they have also reterritorialized global health.
Three  forms  of  reterritorialization  can  be  charted  that  to  varying
degrees  represent  the  flip  sides  of  the  deterritorialization  dynamics
described in Section 1.  First, we consider the selectivity of ‘investment
in health’ arguments and the ways in which the search for so-called
‘best buys’ or cost-effective returns on investment leads to exclusions.
Second, we examine the related patterns of sub-national targeting and
the ways this leads to a return to disease-specific vertical interventions
in  often  enclaved  sites  of  therapeutic  citizenship.    And  third  we
consider how the intersection of these global health investment logics
with  the  self-investment  practices  of  personalized  medicine  is
nevertheless socially-situated in ways that create an ongoing struggle
over the meaning and scope of global health citizenship.  
First of all, the beginnings of today’s  investment in health trends can
themselves be traced back to the eclipse of the idealism of Alma Ata.
While the declaration’s emphasis on Primary Health Care (PHC) was
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rendered impossible to implement due to SAPs and conditionality, its
replacement by something far less universal and inclusive was enabled
by the counter-movement of Selective Primary Health Care (SPHC). For
PHC  promoters  at  the  WHO,  SPHC  appeared  thus  as  a  ‘counter-
revolution’ (Newell, 1988).  Supported by the Rockefeller foundation,
UNICEF, USAID and the World Bank, SPHC was argued to be a cost-
effective  way  of  targeting  interventions  on  a  limited  number  of
diseases in order to maximize the number of lives saved with limited
resources. During the 1980’s, as resources in debt burdened countries
became  still  more  scarce  due  to  conditionality  and  SAPs,  it  was
precisely this SPHC emphasis on cost-effective targeting that grew in
influence, promoted as a way of delivering what an influential UNICEF
report called Adjustment with a human face (Jolly et al, 1984). 
The selectivity of  UNICEF’s ‘Child  Survival’  programming,  led by Jim
Grant’s calls for ‘emergency’ action with GOBI (Growth Monitoring, Oral
Rehydration,  Breast-feeding  and  Immunization),  thereby  came  to
dominate over the PHC plans Mahler had been championing as director
of the WHO (Cueto, 2004). This is all important to note because it has
been  the  same  cost-effectiveness  concern  with  rationing  scarce
resources that has created the basis for today’s financialized focus in
global health on maximizing returns on investment.  However, along
the way the Washington Consensus on market fundamentalism that
contributed to the health emergencies amidst which SPHC was first
justified has morphed itself into a new consensus on investments in
market foster-care (Mitchell and Sparke, 2016). 
At  the  World  Bank  and  among  economists  in  DC  the  original
Washington  Consensus  was  always  supposed  to  encourage
investments in primary health care and education.  This was in fact the
second  reform  on  John  Williamson’s  (in)famous  original  list  of  ten
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Consensus norms (Williamson, 1990).  The problem was that all  the
austerity forced on indebted countries by conditionality and SAPs made
such investments by national governments impossible.  Nevertheless,
in 1993 the Bank’s Investing in Health report gave a new impetus and
direction to investment thinking (World Bank, 1993).  It still retained
the consensus cant about achieving health through the pursuit of pro-
market  macro-economic  growth  policies,  including  the  promotion  of
privatization and user fees. 
However, in addition it also included a new SPHC-inspired attention to
making targeted cost-effective investments in ‘minimum packages’ of
interventions such as immunizations and the treatment of childhood
diseases.  To rank and justify the priority of such packages in terms of
return  on  investment,  the  report  in  turn  presented  metrics  of  the
Global  Burden of  Disease (GBD)  as  measured in  terms of  Disability
Adjusted Life Years (DALYS), the latter being innovatively calculated for
the first time as the sum of years lost to premature death and to life
lived with disease and disability due to a comprehensive list of causes.
The goal of creating this single globally comparable metric was not just
to  compare  the  burdens  created  by  different  diseases  in  different
contexts.   In  addition,  there  was  an underlying  economic  efficiency
imperative as well.  This was to enable cost-effectiveness comparisons
of the number of DALYS averted by different targeted interventions per
dollar  spent,  thereby  enabling  the  comparison  of  returns  on
investments by type of intervention, by cause of illness, and by country
across the whole world. 
DALYS-per-dollar cost-effectiveness comparisons have now become the
most influential guide for investment in global  health.   But even as
they  allow  for  reinvestment  where  rollback  neoliberalism  led  to
disinvestment,  their  employment  in  selecting  ‘best  buys’  in  global
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health still encodes certain neoliberal assumptions. Critics highlight in
this  way that the method’s underlying assumptions about economic
productivity, and the associated age and disability weightings used to
calculate DALYS, assume that the capitalist  productivity  potential  of
human capital is the ultimate measure of human value (Kenny, 2017;
Laurie, 2015). Kenny further underlines how this economization of life
represents a fundamental shift from ‘Health for All’  to ‘Health as an
Investment’ (Kenny, 2017).  
More  generally,  the  calculus  of  cost-effectiveness  and  all  the
associated investment language now pervades much of global health.
The big new global health organizations with their focus on maximizing
returns on investment in their own selective issue areas are all good
examples. The Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations (GAVI),
Rollback Malaria, and most notable of all for its overarching investment
fund approach,  the  Global  Fund to  Fight  AIDS,  TB and Malaria,  are
constantly seeking to fine-tune and leverage their investments based
on arguments about their cost effectiveness.  Wide-ranging investment
experiments are also being developed by many other public-private
partnerships (PPPs), all with a view to maximizing returns on goals sets
by donors (McGoey et al, 2011; Ruckert and Labonté, 2014).  And the
Wall Street styled search for fast returns and best buys has even given
the design of brochures devoted to the causes of global health the look
and feel of financial investment magazines with dollar signs, geared-
globes, and corporate sponsorship from big pharma all included.
The arguments made in favor of taking the new investment approach
to  global  health  are  clear  enough.   It  rationally  and  transparently
rations  scarce  resources,  directing  them  selectively  to  the  health
interventions  that  will  relieve  the  biggest  burdens.   It  brings  clear
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metrics of accountability,  reducing risks of waste and corruption.  It
creates the possibility of both leveraging and hedging donor funding
through periods of budgetary upheaval and austerity.  It communicates
global  health  needs  and  opportunities  in  the  terminology  of  global
finance and thus of global power and global donors. And, perhaps most
important of all, it is ultimately about maximizing returns measured in
lives saved rather than riches gained.  But with all these arguments
noted, it is equally important to highlight how the resulting approaches
tend to enclose health governance within selective health burden silos
and  thereby  also  exclude  from  global  health  citizenship  people
suffering  from  the  wrong  diseases  in  the  wrong  places,  including
especially  populations  with  non-communicable  diseases  and  other
health  burdens  that  are  not  readily  treated  with  biomedical
interventions parachuted in from afar. Diabetics in Kenya, for example,
have been described thus by medical anthropologists as enduring the
'biological  sub-citizenship'  of  patchy  fee-based  treatment  when
compared with the comprehensive and free medical care that has been
won for HIV-positive patients in donor-funded AIDS programs (Bosire et
al,  2018).   It  is  precisely  these  problems  of  selective  treatment,
exclusion from universal  primary care, and biological  sub-citizenship
that are the hallmarks, indeed landmarks, of reterritorialization.
For  many  critical  commentators,  the  problems  of  enclosure,  of
exclusion and of global health interventions administered from afar can
largely be understood as a reversion to historical norms established
under imperialism and the organization of colonial medicine.  Packard’s
historical  comparisons  of  contemporary  global  health  with  colonial
medicine make a compelling case in this way that there are six key
continuities (Packard 2016: 8-9). 
i) The imposition of health interventions from afar with little local
collaboration. 
31
ii) The bias towards biomedical technologies aimed at selected
problems.
iii) The bias against primary health and basic health services.
iv)  The  tendency  to  tackle  health  problems  only  on  an
emergency basis.
v)  The  devaluation  of  local  knowledge  in  contrast  to  faith  in
western medicine.
vi) The belief that improving health will lead to wealth.
In  each  case,  these  continuities  are  clear.  But  insofar  as  their
contemporary  reproduction  has  been  enabled  as  a  form  of  rollout
neoliberalism  following  rollback  neoliberalism,  it  is  also  possible  to
argue that the historical regime change in neoliberalism itself has led
to many of the resulting reterritorializations.  
Where market fundamentalism led to policies that undermined local
governments,  neopaternalist  patterns  of  market  foster  care  tend to
turn  local  communities  into  the  smiling  but  still  non-governing
groupings of what one critic has called ‘recipiency’ (Kenworthy, 2014).
Where  conditionality  and  SAPs  made  universal  primary  health  care
impossible, cost-effectiveness analyses bring biomedical best buys and
high  tech  fixes.   Where  the  1980’s  and  1990’s  bequeathed  global
health  crises  such  as  the  AIDS  pandemic,  the  new millennium has
created serial calls for tackling each crisis in a selective fashion as a
targeted focus for emergency action.  Where SAPs eviscerated local
control  and  simply  overruled  local  expertise,  the  global  health
counterparts  of  PRSPs  such  as  Global  Fund  country-coordinating
mechanisms  (CCMs)  advertise  country  ownership  while  still  pre-
selecting the main priorities for intervention.  And where the faithful of
market fundamentalism believed that adjustment and austerity would
eventually  lead  through  wealth  to  health,  the  advocates  of  market
foster-care insist that their targeted investments in health will lead to
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wealth  (Mitchell  and  Sparke,  2016).   Undoubtedly,  this  post-
Washington Consensus neoliberal  revisionism has roots in the wider
social investment policy norms articulated by self-styled 'Third Way'
leaders  such as  Tony Blair  and Gerhard Shröder  at  the turn of  the
millennium.   "The  most  important  task  of  modernization,"  they
maintained, "is to invest in human capital: to make the individual and
businesses fit for the knowledge-based economy of the future" (quoted
in Jenson, 2010:  64).   But  leading to a New Washington Consensus
actively invested in by philanthrocapitalists such as Seattle-based Bill
Gates, this future oriented ROI mindset has further narrowed the focus
for  investment  to  very  specific  global  health  targets.   It  is  to  the
resulting reterritorialization that we now turn.
Target-setting that repeatedly turns disease and demographic targets
into  territorial  targets  for  intervention  is  in  fact  the  second  major
manifestation of  reterritorialization associated with the selectivity  of
contemporary global health investments.  In a useful warning aimed at
policy-makers, the public health specialist Laurie Garrett summarized
the practical problems well:
Legislatures in the major donor nations should consider how the
current targeting requirements they place on their funding may
have adverse outcomes. For example, the U.S. Congress and its
counterparts  in  Europe  and  Canada  have  mandated  HIV/AIDS
programs that set specific targets for the number of people who
should receive ARVs, be placed in orphan-care centers, obtain
condoms, and the like. If these targets are achievable only by
robbing  local  health-care  workers  from  pediatric  and  general
health programs, they may well do more harm than good, and
should be changed or eliminated” (Garrett, 2007: 16).
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But  despite  such  warnings,  change  seems  unlikely  because  of  the
overarching regime change of neoliberalism that has led to the rollout
of  investment  logics  in  landscapes  devastated  by  prior  rounds  of
rollback. With its focus on making cost-effective investments in these
landscapes, global health keeps setting targets, and this target-setting
is what leads in turn to the challenge of identifying particular places for
intervention  on  the  ground.   A  good  example  of  this  approach  is
provided by the work of Jeffrey Sachs.  A former market fundamentalist
advisor  of  radical  rollback  shock  therapy,  Sachs  has  gone  on  to
become a major advocate of market foster-care investments in global
health.  As such his work moves repeatedly between global forms of
target setting such as the Millennium Development Goals – which he
was central to establishing at the UN – to the practice of identifying
spatial targets for intervention on the ground – such as the Millennium
Villages  that  his  Earth  Institute  at  Columbia  has  established  for
targeted investments in Africa.  The overall approach is imagined in
terms  of  making  precisely  targeted  investments  in  places  stuck  in
cycles of poverty and ill-health, all with the vision of improving health
and fostering resiliency in the local populations so that they can climb
the so-called ladder of global growth. 
The more generalized transformation of population health targets into
spatial targets is what creates the need for investment advice articles
with titles such as “WHERE TO INVEST IN GLOBAL HEALTH IN 2014”.
But as Garrett argued, it also creates problems on the ground such as
internal brain drain, problems that can further damage health systems
already undermined by austerity. Simon Reid-Henry has observed in
this regard that: “Hitting one’s targets may indeed be the quickest way
to missing the goal.” (2016: 721).  What he means by this is that the
global health target-setting and associated accountability metrics lead
to such narrowly selective interventions that the larger goal of making
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global health truly global and inclusive for all is forever put on hold.
“Mainstream global health,” he argues, “is thus best thought of not so
much as a solution to the problem of  actual  health need,  but  as a
solution  to  the  problem  of  ill-health  as  an  externality  of  global
capitalism” (Reid-Henry, 2016: 722).  
The  recent  Lancet  Commission  on  Investing  in  Health is  a  good
illustration of where this market-accommodating investment approach
leads  global  health  (Jamison  et  al., 2013).  Focused  on  increasing
economic growth and the economic value of additional life-years, the
Commission’s report argued that through expert analytical targeting of
the best investment opportunities “good reasons exist to be optimistic
about seeing the global  health landscape completely transformed in
this way within a generation” (Jamison et al., 2013:1947).  The authors
were no doubt right about the transformations, but not necessarily in
the  sanguine  conclusions  they  reached  about  a  grand  global
convergence in improved world health outcomes by 2035. They made
an  upbeat  investment  pitch  for  sure,  and  it  notably  reworked  the
inevitability  assumptions of  traditional  trickle-down neoliberalism for
the  cause  of  persuading  policy-makers  that  health  investments  will
inevitably make the world a more prosperous as well as a more healthy
place  in  a  short  space  of  time.   But  the  more  likely  landscape  of
transformation,  the  one  in  fact  that  has  already  been  significantly
transformed by all the investments, exists on the ground where the
selected  population  level  targets  become  spatial  targets  for
intervention.   Due  to  all  the  associated  disease-specific  and  place-
specific targeting, and due also to the attendant tendencies towards
non-collaborative, non-sustainable vertical interventions implemented
with public-private partnerships, it has become a patchwork landscape
of enclosure, exclusion and fragmentation.
35
Surveying the patchy and fragmented landscape of  global  health,  a
group  of  leading  global  health  equity  advocates  responded  to  the
Lancet Investing in Health report arguing that it represented a deeply
concerning  “re-run  of  the  1993  World  Development  Report,  whose
policies  contributed to the shrinkage of  government institutions  and
massive  privatisation  and  fragmentation  of  health-care  systems,
effectively  decreasing  coverage  and  accessibility”  (Chiriboga  et  al,
2014).   Their  critique  concluded  by  arguing  that  the  Commission’s
report had presented:
a  biased  perspective  reminiscent  of  failed  neoliberal
prescriptions…. The recommendations are based on the principle
of return on investment, not on health equity, while creating a
double standard: one for the rich and another for the rest of us”
(Chiriboga et al, 2014).
Another upshot of the subordination of universality to selectivity under
the  targeting  logics  of  rollout  neoliberalism  has  been  the
transformation of  the meanings of  health citizenship and associated
health rights in targeted sites of investment.  Reflective of the shift
away  from  the  standards  of  equity  and  inclusion  underlined  by
Chiriboga  and  colleagues,  the  disease-specific  investment  approach
appears instead to tend towards the creation of what Vinh-Kim Ngyuen
has called ‘Republics of Therapy’ (Ngyuen, 2010). As an anthropologist
physician, Ngyuen is especially interested in how his AIDS patients in
west  Africa  feel  obliged  in  such  places  to  narrate  their  own
seropositivity  in  such  a  way  as  to  qualify  for  the  disease-specific
treatment that such enclaves of care are offering.  In other words, to
qualify for health rights and health citizenship in the disease-specific
global health republics, patients have to present with the right disease,
in  the  right  place,  at  the  right  time.   And  just  as  the  roll-out
investments  and  interventions  are  siloed  by  selectivity,  Nguyen
36
thereby depicts a form of therapeutic sovereignty in the republics that
creates health citizenship rights and care for some but, because of the
reterritorialization of disease-specific health rights, not for all.  These
enclaving  effects  appear  to  intersect  in  turn  with  the  wider  spatial
pattern  of  creating  securitized  compounds  and  enclosures  of
intervention  in  contemporary  neoliberal  aid  efforts  more  generally
(Smirl, 2015).
A  third  instantiation  of  these  reterritorialized  sovereignty  effects
relates  to  the  ways  in  which  the  biomedical  bias  of  global  health
interventions  can  fail  to  address  the  wider  social  determinants  of
health.   Another  physician anthropologist  has  described in  this  way
how  his  patients  receiving  ARVs  in  Mozambique  suffered  terrible
hunger pangs due to the fact that the biomedical treatment regime did
not guarantee decent food even as it  led their recovering bodies to
require  new  nourishment  (Kolofonos,  2010).    “All  I  eat  is  ARVs,”
complained  one  such  patient,  describing  in  a  single  sentence  the
obvious  disconnect  of  personalized  biomedical  HIV/AIDS  treatment
from the wider political-economic context of daily survival.   Elsewhere
in Kenya, South Africa and India, global health scholars have shown
that a disease such as diabetes can be overlooked as a comorbidity
alongside AIDS and TB when the treatment of the overall ‘syndemic’ of
a  wider  health-damaging  context  is  replaced  by  disease-specific
treatment in a specific place (Mendenhall et al, 2017).
This kind of disconnect represents a kind of reterritorialization that is
also repeated in a rather different way in the cubicles of personalized
medicine  in  much  wealthier  contexts.   Providing  the  individualized
healthcare ‘consumer’ with diverse self-investment opportunities, the
personalized  metrics  of  disease  management  are  increasingly
disconnected  from everyday life  and  a  holistic  consideration  of  the
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social  determinants  of  health.  When  illness  comes  it  tends  to  be
reframed  thus  in  terms  of  personal  responsibility  tied  to  individual
behaviors and risk factors, creating tendencies towards self-blame that
represent a secondary health burden or what some have described as
the ‘double burden’ of neoliberalism (Glasgow and Schrecker, 2015).
For more enfranchised biological citizens of personalized medicine, the
resulting  rollout  neoliberal  vision  is  about  managing  risk  and
maximizing returns on biological self-investment.  But for many others,
the  outcome is  a  biological  sub-citizenship  of  self-blame associated
with what remains structurally-foreclosed self-investment. As a form of
biopolitical governmentality, these effects would seem to align exactly
with what Michel  Foucault  anticipated in his lectures on how health
care was being reimagined in American neoliberalism.  
[A]ll  activities  concerning  the  health  of  individuals  will  thus
appear as so many elements which enable us, first to improve
human capital, and second to preserve and employ it as long as
possible.  Thus  all  the  problems  of  health  care  and  public
hygiene… can be rethought as elements which may or may not
improve human capital” (Foucault, 2008: 230). 
Foucault’s  points  about  human capital  now bring us back full  circle
here to the Human Capital Project with which this article began. Clearly
for Jim Kim there is no contradiction between this World Bank project
and his  critique of  ‘trickle  down’  neoliberalism in  Dying for  Growth.
“Measuring the economic benefits of investments in human capital,”
he contends, “does not diminish the social and intrinsic value of better
health  and  education”  (Kim  2018b:  100).   But  as  is  noted  by  the
authors  of  the  first  global  health  metrics  analysis  of  the  rankings
envisioned by the project, the calculus of value does nevertheless shift.
“[T]he emphasis on human capital,” they note, “signals a shift toward
greater consideration of the productive value of health and education,
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in  addition  to  humanitarian  objectives”  (Lim  et  al, 2018:  1230).
Considered  thus  as  one  more  example  of  rollout  neoliberalism
preoccupied  with producing value in  a  competitive  global  economy,
and  considered  as  an  investment-oriented  project  tied  to  making
advice to countries about best health and education buys in human
capital, the project seems prone from the start to some of the same
problems  of  reterritorialization  identified  above.  It  is  with  some
reflections on these problems that we will therefore now conclude.
Regime  change  and  the  return  of  history:  concluding
reflections
When Kim and his colleagues wrote in  Dying for Growth about how
history repeats itself, and when they thereby warned about how a new
‘ism’  might  replace  neoliberalism  in  the  new  millennium,  they
effectively anticipated the regime change from rollback neoliberalism
to rollout neoliberalism that has been described in this article.  They
also might well have been silently quoting Marx’s reference to Hegel
and history’s repetitions at the start of The Eighteenth Brumaire. Marx
himself continued another few lines later to describe how the “tradition
of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of  the
living”  (Marx,  1852).  Of  course,  this  was  most  likely  not what  the
editors  at  Davos  were  thinking  about  when  they  published  Kim’s
description of the Human Capital Project under the title of ‘What keeps
the President of the World Bank up at night?’  Nevertheless, it surely
does  raise  questions  about  how  the  traditions  and  constraints  of
rollback turned rollout neoliberalism might still weigh like a nightmare
on the reimagination of global health today.
One  approach  to  exploring  such  questions  might  be  personal  and
psychoanalytical, perhaps concerning reinvestment thinking as a form
compensatory psychological investment in utopianism amidst a deeply
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dystopian  world.   But  inspired  in  part  by  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s
refusals of such gestures, this is not the interpretation offered here.
Instead,  guided  by  more  material  re-workings  of  the  two
poststructuralist’s terminology – the terminology of deterritorialization
and reterritorialization – the overarching aim of this article has been to
put  the  programmatic  rollout  of  developments  such  as  the  Human
Capital Project into a larger global context of developmental regime
change.  Important interventions elsewhere have asked whether Kim’s
own  biosocial  approach  has  remade  the  World  Bank  or  has  been
‘resocialized’ by world banking (Bond, 2012 & 2019; Horton, 2013 and
2017; and Shaffer, 2018). By contrast, the focus here on the context of
neoliberal  regime  change  suggests  that  Kim’s  presentation  of  the
Human Capital Project is of a piece with the new neoliberal tendencies
towards reterritorialization. 
 Against this  conclusion  at least  two important  objections  might  be
made.  The  first  counter-argument  is  that  there  is  a  big  difference
between  financial  investment  in  human  capital  and  the  kind  of
spending on global health and education that Kim and his colleagues
seek to incentivize.  Advocates of humanitarianism, human rights and
inclusive  citizenship  have  often  had  to  present  their  arguments  in
investment language in the past, and Kim’s interventions at the World
Bank  may have  been  no  different.  It  is  worth  remembering  in  this
respect  that  when  Edwin  Chadwick  was  campaigning  for  better
treatment and health for the poor in Victorian England, he too turned
to an argument about cost-effectiveness: in short  “the expenditures
necessary to the adoption and maintenance of measures of prevention
would  ultimately  amount  to  less  than  the  cost  of  disease  now
constantly  expended”  (quoted  in  Rosen,  1993:  187).  In  comparison
with this gentle accounting, Kim’s call to shaming action announced in
a speech at Harvard sounded far more radical. 
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“We’re going to do a ranking, from 1 to 150. We’re going to rank
countries  based on their  stock of  human capital.  [As a result]
“Heads of  state,  ministers of  finance, must be terrified of  not
investing  more  in  their  people…  Let’s  make  it  very
uncomfortable  to  not  invest  in  health  and  education”  (Kim
quoted in Shaffer, 2018).
Another objection to the argument that the  Human Capital Project is
just another example of rollout neoliberalism relates to arguments by
Kim  and  his  colleagues  in  Reimagining  Global  Health about
contextualizing and diagonalizing global health delivery.  The book is
forthright  in  its  critique  of  the  rollback  relays  between  “neoliberal
policies  and  the  witting  and  unwitting  weakening  of  public-sector
health systems” (Farmer et al, 2013: xix), and it is in this same critical
spirit that it also advocates for diagonalization as a strategy of using
vertical investments in disease-specific programs to support horizontal
health systems and their public sector governance. 
These arguments align in part with some of the recommendations of
the WHO Maximizing Positive Synergies Collaborative Group on which
Kim worked (WHO, 2009).  But they are given great contextual depth
and accountability by all the work undertaken by  Partners in Health
(PIH) in countries such as Haiti, Peru and Rwanda. As such, this work
might be said to re-contextualize reterritorialization, but collaboratively
and  with  maximal  respect  for  local  community  leadership  and
expertise.  Human  capital  investment  incentivization  is  still
acknowledged  in  such  efforts  as  vulnerable  to  the  same
reterritorializing  constraints  and  contortions  of  global  health
investment more generally,  but following the model of work by PIH,
Kim’s  colleagues  in  reimagining  global  heath  suggest  that  the
problems  can  be  mitigated  in  practice.  Reimagined  as  attempts  to
extend care where both colonialism and neoliberalism cut if off, such
work  therefore  involves  explicit  efforts  to  overcome  the  limits  of
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reterritorialization  through  various  strategies  for  fostering  health
systems strengthening as well as repairing, rather than just managing,
the damage done by market forces. 
Elsewhere work on Health Systems Strengthening (HSS) suggests that
supposedly diagonal lines of investment nevertheless often end up just
augmenting  vertical  delivery  system  investments  in  ways  that  are
distant from universal government-run primary health care (Storeng,
2014).   Despite heroic attempts by some groups to redirect vertical
investment approaches in  diagonal  directions,  therefore,  investment
imperatives and cost-effectiveness calculations continue to drive much
of  global  health  in  highly  selective  and  thus  both  patchy  and
exclusionary directions.  They certainly challenge the deterritorializing
disinvestment legacies of  rollback neoliberalism,  but their  neoliberal
rollout of targeting logics aimed at maximizing returns on reinvestment
leads  nevertheless  to  a  patchwork  of  reterritorializing  interventions
that in turn tend to enclave and thus limit access to the reconstructive
effort.   It  is  precisely  this  patchy  and  limiting  effect  of
reterritorialization that this article has sought to examine and explain
in  terms of  neoliberal  regime change.   Whether  or  not  the  Human
Capital Project can be radically recontextualized in ways that avoids
these problems with reinvestment remains to be seen.
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